Terrorism and CBRNE Awareness Education - Essay

 

 

 

 

 

 

Terrorism and CBRNE Awareness Education

Richard Hildreth

American Military University #4089144

HLSS 211 - Emergency Response to Terrorism

Professor Michael Thornal

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Terrorism and CBRNE Awareness Education

Few people would disagree that if given the opportunity, there are terrorists who would be willing to use CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive) weapons on American soil. History has shown that Al-Qaida and other groups have experimented with or attempted to obtain CBRNE weapons. It is believed that at least from a knowledge standpoint, they may be capable of delivery and we are lucky to have not already faced multiple CBRNE events.  When such an event does occur, the impact may reach far beyond the footprint of the attack itself; fear, frustration, anger and disruption of normal life will work as a force multiplier and extend the impacts across the nation.  This is why, as part of our overall national preparedness, a realistic training program on terrorism and CBRNE weapons is important. In addition to the DHS funded training programs such as those taught at the Center for Domestic Preparedness (http://cdp.dhs.gov/) in Anniston Alabama, entry level training programs that stress the need for CBRNE preparedness need to be developed.  We can have the best preparedness and training programs in the world; if we do not get the right people to recognize the scope of the problem these great training programs can never truly be effective.

CBRNE Awareness training of responders, business and government leaders as well as civilian volunteers can help mitigate the threat and impact of CBRNE events.  This training should include recognition of the threat itself, understanding of the impacts of an attack and recognition of what may be vulnerable as a target. The training must stress critical thinking, not be limited to tactics of conventional warfare and provide just enough detail to demonstrate how critical CBRNE preparedness is.  If this awareness training gets too detailed, it is possible that participants will lose interest or feel the training is too complicated for them to understand.  The training should not be teaching participants what to think, as the threat itself is constantly evolving; instead it should be encouraging participants to think out of the box as the next attack may be asymmetrical in nature.  As the 9/11 Commission stated in its final report, the acts of September 11, 2001 was “a failure of imagination” (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004).  We can never again allow that type of failure to threaten the United States of America.

Terrorism itself is defined in 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 as “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (FBI General Functions, 1969).  It could be domestic in origin, committed on US soil by US residents; or it could be international in origin, funded or conducted by any number of extremist organizations who normally operate outside of US borders.  Unlike acts of war, targets of terrorism events are often civilians and the events are not conducted by state or government sponsored military units.  We cannot allow preconceived notions to limit our perspective of who a terrorist might be.  Realistic discussion of what terrorism is needs to be part of this CBRNE awareness training.

Too often when the word “terrorism” is used, people will automatically think of Islamic Fundamentalist and forget that is only one facet of the terrorism threat. It is true that groups like Al-Qaida (AQ) and Islamic Jihad Group (IJU) are Islamic terrorist organizations ("Counter Terrorism 2013 Calendar," 2012), but they are not the only organizations promoting terrorist acts on US soil.  US born organizations motivated by political, religious, environmental or other issues have been known to commit acts of terror on US soil and can be expected to do so again (United States Air Force, 2004).  Recognizing who the terrorist might be and what their motivational factors are is critical in any training program. Perceptions of ideology and motivation are important factors in determining possible targets and vulnerabilities. It should be remembered that most people of Islamic faith are not jihadist. Just like most environmental activists would never think about committing an act of terrorism. The fact is, even inside many activist organizations and communities, acts of terrorism are often disdained (Smith, R. K. 38:2). Too often, people will overreact to legitimate protest, blame innocent ethnic communities and paint entire organizations or populations as terrorist.  A problem this creates is the alienation of members of a community that might otherwise be willing to provide information that could help stop a real act.  Recognition of who the terrorists are and more importantly are not is a critical part of any awareness program.

The type of target selected can often be predicted by the overall objectives of an individual or group. Politically motivated groups or individuals will more likely chose highly symbolic targets such as government buildings, banks and multinational corporations. Groups like ALF (Animal Liberation Front) and ELF (Earth Liberation Front) might choose a university research laboratory or a large scale development. In trying to promote political, religious or social change, a soft target may also be chosen primarily to inject fear, hopelessness and a feeling that government cannot protect them.  The ability to perceive motivational factors is a key aspect of mitigating threats (Hildreth, 2013).  This discussion needs to be a part of the CBRNE awareness training.

Recognition of vulnerabilities and symbolism is also a critical part of this training.  Large manufacturing, power plants, critical infrastructure and places of assembly all have certain aspects that make them attractive as a target; however targets that also have some symbolic relationship raise their attractiveness. As an example, if reports are received warning that  a local Neo Nazi organization, is planning an attack on April 20 (Adolph Hitler’s birthday) it would make sense that likely targets might include a Jewish Synagogue or a location promoting the mixing of races.  If a report is received that Al-Qaida wants to attack the US in revenge for the death of Osama Bin Laden, additional measures around likely targets might be considered around the first week of May. A target might not be chosen with the purpose of killing the most number of civilians but rather to cause severe economic, social and physiological impact.  Every target is not going to be a high level visible target such as the World Trade Center. In a world where asymmetric targets and warfare is used, creativity and critical thinking is essential in planning (Kolodzie, 2001). The training program should be written to promote this level of analysis.

Currently, most communities lack the capacity to adequately deal with the consequences of a CBRNE attack. We lack enough trained personnel, even combining all federal and private resources (Franco & Bouri, 2010).  Education programs can help leverage the limited resources if communities take advantage of the programs available. The purpose of this CBRNE awareness training would be to expose responders and leadership to the real threats and vulnerabilities in hopes they will then reflect on their own capabilities.

This program should follow the proven adult education concepts of combining lecture with exercise and group activities. It should be a realistic discussion of the challenges they might have in conducting a CBRNE attack, while tempered with the reality that many of these challenges can be overcome by determined individuals. In addition to discussions, participants should have the opportunity to practice what they have learned in exercises using dramatic yet plausible scenarios. Prior to September 11, 2001, few people would have thought of terrorists flying commercial airliners into the World Trade Center and Pentagon as a viable threat. The following scenarios are examples taken from Homeland Security Table Top exercises. This training should include exercises that cause the participant to consider the impacts of worst case scenarios. They should stress how terrorist events might use events to create paralyzing fear and disruption of services. The following are two examples of Table Top Exercises currently under development.

(Note: both of these Scenarios are original materials being used for TTX exercises to be developed.  Scenario 1 would be used for a class similar to what I teach at EMI.  Scenario 2 would be used for a local Seattle based exercise.)

Scenario 1- Chemical Attack:

A terrorist cell, loosely affiliated with Al-Qaida of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is believed to be planning an attack to coincide with the anniversary of the September 11^th terror attacks. Possible targets are unknown but the cell is believed to possess large amounts of potassium cyanide and sulfuric acid. Three members of this cell were last seen driving north on US 107 from Fisherville, located in Liberty County, State of Columbia.

A school district work van pulls into the parking lot of John Chapman Elementary School located on K and 3^rd Ave in Central City.  Two men get out wearing what appears to be maintenance uniforms and proceed to an HVAC unit located on a lower roof. The workmen access the air intake system on one of the units and install a device that upon command will allow liquid sulfuric acid to mix with crystalized potassium cyanide.  The unit produces hydrogen cyanide gas at a concentration of about 5600 ppm and is ingested into the school’s air conditioning system. The men exit the roof, walk quickly to the work van and drive off.

Inside the classroom the first hints of something wrong is the faint odor of almonds.  The first symptoms are an increased heart rate and restlessness of the teachers and children located in the classroom directly underneath the HVAC unit. Some students soon complain about headaches, while others appear giddy and intoxicated.  Shortly thereafter the teacher and five children collapse and a panicked classroom of children down the hall towards the main office. Other classrooms appear to be suffering similar issues.

After a period of confusion the school notifies authorities and evacuates the school.  It is noticed that of the estimated 300 students and 39 staff on campus that morning, less than half appear to be out of the school. As responders enter the school, initial tests show a concentration of 50 mg/m³ near the entrance and higher concentrations of 200 mg/m³ near the first classroom.  Responders also notice 12 adults and 65 children collapsed in the hallway, some dead and some suffering severe respiratory problems.  Additional victims, 3 adults and 15 more children are dead in the first two classrooms.  A group of 20 students and a teacher are found in the library huddled in a corner; although some exhibit symptoms of poisoning concentrations were less than 30 mg/m³ and everyone is safe.

 

Key Talking Points:

·         Would this be seen as an effective attack?  Why?

·         How viable would an attack like this be on a school or other soft target in your jurisdiction?

·         What would be the impact in your jurisdiction if this event was to happen elsewhere in the nation?

·         What would be the impact on your responders if this was to happen in your jurisdiction?

·         What steps could be done to reduce the vulnerability of this school?

 

Instructors Notes:

·         An event like this would result in panic across this nation; if we cannot protect our children against a chemical attack like this then no one is safe. 

·         A natural impact across this nation would be paralyzing fear and a reluctance to allow children to go to school.  Additionally children themselves would have unreasonable fear as they have more difficulty separating actual vulnerability from imagination. 

·         Responders would most likely need counseling. Some could suffer from severe depression and possibly suicide. 

·         The unfortunate reality is there is little that could be done to prevent this type of attack.  Some mitigation such as locked access to HVAC units could be used; however it would be difficult to prevent access.

NOTE: Concentrations and effects of gas courtesy of Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (Hydrogen Cyanide, 2010).

 

 

Scenario 2 – Dirty Bomb

Part One

The Port of Seattle and the Department of Homeland Security has spent millions of dollars installing security, radiation detectors and other equipment in the 5 waterfront terminals located in King County, Washington. Like other port districts across the nation, concerns over the possibility of a dirty bomb being brought into the United States in a shipping container have resulted in multi-layer screening of shipping containers.  These screenings include inspections at port of origin, while in transit and in port. The concerns are centered on the possibility of a radiological weapon being detonated in one of America’s major ports and the world wide impacts that might have on international trade (Rosoff & von Winterfeldt, 2007, p. 536).

Key Talking Points:

·         What impacts could be expected if a Radiological Device was detonated in the Port of Seattle?

·         How would this disrupt International trade?

·         What would the economic impacts of this event be?

·         Are there any weaknesses in the security system that could be improved to prevent this type of event?  At what cost?

 

Part Two

Shortly after 8 AM, a driver approaches Terminal 47 near downtown Seattle with a container being shipped from the Midwest to China.  The container was picked up at the nearby rail switching yard by a contract driver. All shipping documents appear to be correct and the driver is directed to a row of containers to await loading onto an outgoing ship.

At 10:04 a remote detonation device triggers a blasting cap inside the container and detonates 2000 pounds of ANFO (Ammonium Nitrate - Fuel Oil) mixture, surrounded by radiological medical waste; the radioactive material that was, at least on paper supposedly headed for proper disposal by an EPA registered contractor at Yucca Mountains, Nevada. 

The 2000 pounds of ANFO, detonates at a VOD (Velocity of Detonation) of over 12,000 fps ("Explosives - ANFO (Ammonium," 2011), and results in a blast area of ¼ mile (Introduction to Explosives, 2012, p.17).  Radioactive debris from the medical waste is scattered throughout waterfront area.  A plume of smoke and radioactive material drifts towards Pioneer Square and the SODO district of Seattle.

Key Points:

·         How would the impacts of this event be different than an incident from a ship side container?

·         How would this impact International Shipping?

·         What could the economic impacts of this event be?

Instructors Notes:

·         Economic impact of this event (not including decontamination) would be an estimated $200 million for a month long shut down.

·         Decontamination cost could be in the $10 - $100 million range

 

When the next CBRNE attack occurs on US soil, will we be prepared?  Will our responders have the proper training and equipment and will our policy leaders recognize the critical need for CBRNE preparedness? The purpose of training programs like the one proposed is to help move our nation in that direction. There will always be resistance from those individuals who suffer from the Ostrich Syndrome (Goldsmith, 1970).  To them it is easier to ignore the possibility and hope that it never occurs. We may never have 100% participation in preparedness or perception of the CBRNE threat: however every time this type of training convinces someone to prepare, that  moves us that much closer to being prepared. 

References:

Counter Terrorism 2013 Calendar. (2012, January 27). Retrieved from National Counter Terrorism Center website: http://www.nctc.gov/site/other/fto.html

Explosives - ANFO (Ammonium Nitrate - Fuel Oil). (2011, July 7). Retrieved from
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/explosives-anfo.htm

FBI General Functions, 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (1969).

Franco, C., & Bouri, N. (2010, April 9). Feds Would Face Problems in a Bio
Attack Clean-Up: Analysis Reveals Progress but Some Gaps Remain. Retrieved
from Center for Biosecurity -University of Pittsburg Medical Center
website: http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/about_us/pressroom/archive/
2010-04-12_decon_report.html

Goldsmith, E. (1970, December 1). The Ostrich Syndrome [Speech transcript].
Retrieved from http://www.edwardgoldsmith.org/717/the-ostrich-syndrome/

Hildreth, R. (Presenter). (2013, March 5). Integrated Emergency Management
Class (IEMC) E-915. Lecture presented at Emergency Management Institute.

Hydrogen Cyanide. (2010). Retrieved from Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons website: http://www.opcw.org/about-chemical-weapons/
types-of-chemical-agent/blood-agents/hydrogen-cyanide/

Kolodzie, M. L. (2001, August). Commentary: the Asymmetric Threat. Retrieved from United States Military Academy - WestPoint website:
http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/JulAug01/MS628.htm

Rosoff, H., & von Winterfeldt, D. (2007). A Risk and Economic Analysis of Dirty
Bomb Attacks on the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. Society for Risk
Analysis, 27(3), 533-546. http://dx.doi.org /10.1111/ j.1539-6924.2007.00908.x

Smith, R. K. (issue 38:2). “Ecoterrorism”?: A Critical Analysis of the
Vilification of Radical Environmental Activists as Terrorists. Retrieved from Lewis and Clark Law School -Environmental law online website: http://www.elawreview.org/elaw/382/ ecoterrorism_a_critical_analys.html

Technical Resource for Incident Prevention: Introduction to Explosives. (2012).
Retrieved from Department of Homeland Security website:
http://info.publicintelligence.net/DHS-Explosives.pdf

The 9/11 Commission Report. (2004, August). Retrieved from National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States website:
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Exec.htm

United States Air Force. (2004). The Dynamic Terrorist Threat (Research Report No. F49642-01-C-0003) (K. Cragin & S. A. Daly, Authors). Retrieved from Rand website: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=