Challenges of Defending Functional Equivalent Borders

Challenges of Defending Functional Equivalent Borders

Richard Hildreth

AMU Student # 4089144

HLSS 311- Border and Costal Security

Professor Justin Novak

Challenges of Defending Functional Equivalent Borders

As the nation’s frontline border security agency, the Customs and Border Protection or CBP is often known as our last line of defense in preventing terrorist and terrorist weapons from entering the United States.  At all Ports of Entry (POE) the CBP is tasked with facilitating legal entry of people and goods to the United States, while preventing illegal migration and the import of contraband items such as narcotics, exotic animals, weapons or any other of the thousands of prohibited items. These tasks often become more complex at Functional Equivalent Borders (FEB’s) such as International Airports because of the somewhat more harried pace and more complex partnerships. Although they are often overlooked in discussions concerning the securing of our borders, CBP operations at these FEB’s can be just as critical to national security as traditional land and maritime border entry points.

At any border crossing, Customs and Border Protection works with a variety of other agencies from public health to transportation officials.  At an International Airport, these same agencies are present, but the presence of traditional airport operations and contractors can add additional challenges. Unlike at a land crossing where a CBP officer has consistent control over the person crossing; there are many other factors that must be considered at international airports. At a land crossing, the arriving individual is usually in a vehicle along with their luggage and other items.  The person crossing and all of their items are not out of the custody of either the person crossing or the CBP officer. That is not the case when a passenger arrives on an international flight.  While the passenger is directed into an arrival hall where a CBP officer begins the processing of the individual, workers, who are employed by the airline, unload luggage and transport it from the aircraft to the Customs facility.  Although these workers have been screened and cleared prior to their employment in a customs area, they are not under the direct control of the CBP or their officers.  When you consider other airline, airport and contractor employees, it is not uncommon for more than fifty additional people to be working inside what would be considered the Functional Equivalent Border.

Although the term has never been clearly defined, Functional Equivalent Borders were established by the 1973 US Supreme Court decision, Almeida-Sanchez v. United States ¹. In this decision, The Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) recognized that entry into the United States also occurs at locations other than traditional geographical border crossings. As such, certain exceptions to the 4^th Amendment protections provided at land border crossings should also extend to these locations ². For the purpose of this paper, the term Functional Equivalent Border shall be defined as an international point of entry located at an international airport. Additionally, this border area will include Customs secured areas, Airport Operations Areas (AOA) immediately adjacent to international gates and areas where passengers, luggage and cargo may be transferred from the aircraft to an inspection area. Because of this expanded area of control, it is much more difficult for CBP officers to monitor normal and threat specific operations. Since 9/11, these challenges have also been complicated by increased demand for homeland security and the restructuring of agencies as well as areas of responsibility.

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) consolidated many agencies previously dealing with border security into the Department of Homeland Security.  Most of these agencies now work under the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security or BTS.

Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) are all key components of BTS. Each agency has distinct roles and responsibilities but all are dedicated to protecting our citizens from terrorism. CBP serves as the primary law enforcement arm of DHS and its efforts are primarily focused at land, maritime and air points of entry ³.  ICE serves as an investigatory arm, handles alien detention and removal as well as some air/marine drug interdiction operations. TSA, which most people narrowly perceive as the agency responsible for airport checkpoints and aircraft security is tasked with securing all transportation systems and ensuring the free movement of people and commerce. There are other important interagency partnerships and interdisciplinary alliances found at border crossings that create a multi-layer border defense to protect security, health and economic interest of the United States.

            At most border crossings you will find customs and immigration officials.  Working alongside them you will find specialized CBP officers that are tasked with agricultural, revenue or homeland security roles. In some cases, CBP personnel will work with State Department, FBI or even CIA assets to prevent or track persons of interest entering the United States.  At International Airports, these partnerships can be even more critical as a result of the sometimes harried pace of operations and the increasing workloads as international trade and travel increase.  The CBP also works with the Center for Disease Control and other public health agencies to control the import of infectious disease. During global outbreaks and crises such as the H7N9 Avian Flu, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) or Hemorrhagic Fever, CBE officers are often the first to spot potentially ill people and redirect them to health authorities.  In many airports, medical professionals with the CDC are co-located with other operations to provide additional screening.

At official ports of entry, the CBP is responsible for conducting immigrations, customs and agricultural inspections for anyone entering the United States. To streamline the border crossing process in 2003, former DHS Secretary Tom Ridge, created the “One Face at the Border” (OFAB) initiative ⁴. Under this initiative, CBP officers may be cross trained and combine Customs, Immigration and Agricultural functions. Although these officers will often maintain their specialized duties at International Airports, their knowledge and perspective is expanded by this cross training to better recognize potential areas of concern with incoming passengers or cargo. The result has been a multilayered team approach that has improved operations while also improving their primary mission, to protect the interest of the United States.

The process for identifying a suspected terrorist or other persons suspected of criminal activity begins long before that person arrives in the United States.  When a foreign national wants to visit or migrate to the United States, they work through the US State Department who is responsible for the issuance of Visa’s ⁵. During this process, certain information is noted that allows for the background of the applicant to be checked against certain lists of known or suspected terrorist or criminals. With many airlines, this visa information is electronically transmitted to officials at the point of arrival while the aircraft is in transit. This allows officers at the point of entry to look at issues such as Country of Origin, recent travel and other pertinent information that might help identify suspected terror suspects.

Upon arrival, CBP officers will match arriving passengers with that list and inspect documentation including Passports, Visas and other papers to ensure authenticity and adherence to US regulations and immigration laws. On average, the CBP identifies and makes 54 criminal arrests every day.  According to Terrance Drafts, the Acting CBP port director in Philadelphia, “Customs and Border Protection officers take great pride in identifying arriving and departing wanted persons at our international ports of entry, and returning them to our law enforcement partners to face justice ⁶.” 

As previously stated, CBP officers are not only on the front line protecting our nation from terrorist and criminals but also in protecting the US during Global Heath Crises.  The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), Center for Disease Control (CDC) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) all partner with border agencies to help stop the import of dangerous disease to the United States. With travelers arriving from almost every part of the world, a passenger who is ill with an infectious disease could spread that disease to fellow passengers or others at the airport. With those passengers then flying back out or using other means of travel this disease could then quickly be spread throughout the country ⁷. It should be noted that, as the number of international flights increase, so does the threat and work load of CBP officers. This is an area the United States cannot afford to fail..

Not all health issues are directly related to the passenger.  Agricultural inspections are made to halt the import of products that may be in violation of US plant and animal protection laws. This enforcement is not only to prevent the import of harmful pests, but also dangerous bacteria, chemicals and other health hazards.  Every year, officers from the CBP’s Agriculture Protection Program find and stop the import of tens of thousands of products containing “actionable pests” identified as dangerous to the health and safety of US Agricultural interest ⁸.  These include invasive species, insect larva, meat products and fruits and vegetable products containing dangerous chemicals or pest.  To accomplish this task, officers use specialized x-ray units capable of detecting organic materials and specially trained canines who sniff out contraband items.  Since 9/11 this threat has expanded from the unintentional import of items to the prevention of agro-terrorism by specifically importing items that could devastate US Agriculture.

The dog chosen as best suited to inspect luggage for food and agricultural products at International Airports is the beagle. Because of their acute sense of smell, their gentle demeanor and their natural love of food, beagles can easily walk among incoming passengers and luggage without raising any undue alarm.  If a dog identifies a subject or a suitcase possibly containing contraband items, it will quietly sit down next to that person or item.  This then provides the handler cause to follow up with questions and / or inspection of the suitcase ⁹. In an unpublished incident at SeaTac Airport in December of 2013, a member of the Beagle Patrol discovered an almost complete swine carcass being transported from China ¹⁰.  In that case, the carcass was wrapped tightly in plastic and scented to throw off CBP personnel and animals.  No motive for the concealed import was given at the time of this article. These specially trained animals can identify concealed items an estimated 80% of the time with that rate rising to 90% or above as they gain experience ¹¹.

Plant and Animal products are not the only contraband discovered at International Airports. Narcotics, ivory, technology and weapons are among items discovered every day by CBP and TSA officers at FEB checkpoints. Additionally, CBP officers may work with other agencies to identify and arrest persons suspected of illegal export of items. In June of 2013, the ring leader of a group who was exporting firearms parts to Thailand was arrested at SeaTac Airport ¹².

In February 2013, CBP officers seized 24 pounds of liquid cocaine smuggled in small cosmetic containers ¹³. According to a 2011 Freedom of Information Request published by governmentattic.org, over 4000 items ranging from cocaine to pornographic materials were seized at Dulles International Airport alone between 2003 and September 2011 ¹⁴. Included in that list were counterfeit items ranging from Rolex watches to counterfeit US currency.

International arrivals of passenger aircraft are not the only responsibility of Customs and Border Protection Officers stationed at International Airports. They are also tasked with the inspection of cargo, both in conjunction with passenger aircraft and cargo only aircraft, as well as passengers and cargo of private aircraft. As such, the CBP has taken steps to toughen General Aviation (GA) requirements and minimize vulnerability gaps that could allow private aircraft to transport illicit materials, dangerous individuals or to be used as weapons in terrorist attacks. Consistent with commercial aviation requirements, new rules now require advanced identification and screening of passengers and crews as well as inspections of cargo. These new rules now require CBP to be notified with all appropriate information at least 60 minutes prior to departure of that aircraft from its point of origin.  Previous rules only required this notification 60 minutes prior to arrival ¹⁵.

With inbound air cargo, both Customs and Border Protection and Transportation Security Administration have significant responsibility.  TSA is tasked with securing US bound flights from destruction or hijacking while CBP is responsible for ensuring that illicit materials including drugs, explosives and other weapons of terror are not included in the cargo ¹⁶. Specifically, CBP inspects inbound cargo to ensure compliance with all appropriate laws and does not pose a security, economic or health risk to the United States. This inspection may include close scrutiny of documents and other information on cargo being shipped and physical inspection of all cargo upon its arrival. Due to budgetary and manpower restrictions, currently only a small percentage of cargo is inspected either at point of origin or upon arrival ¹⁷.

Both CBP and TSA have taken steps to work together to close gaps and to target higher risk cargo and points of origin.  Because DHS has determined the exact percentage of cargo screened or inspected to be Sensitive Security Information (SSI), those figures will not be provided in this open source briefing. The same SSI restrictions also apply to the types of cargo that is targeted or points of origin information.  What can be included in this briefing is that both CBP and TSA have taken appropriate preliminary steps to ensure Homeland Security. It can also be stated that strategic planning has these steps being accelerated as additional resources become available.  It should be noted that both CBP and TSA have established effective working relationships between agencies and with many domestic and foreign air carriers.

The CBP has taken significant steps to close security and efficiency gaps at International Airports.  Through applications of technology, prescreening of frequent travelers through the Global Entry program and use of a multi layered operational approach that includes specialized teams; the CBP has increased efficiency without sacrificing security.  Currently, five US airports have installed kiosks in International Arrival areas that allow US passport holders and Canadian visitors to input answers to questions previously asked by CBP officers, verify Passport information and then have a receipt printed out with the information and their picture.  This receipt is then reviewed by CBP officers, matched with the traveler and in most cases the time and personnel involved has been reduced by half ¹⁸.  With the ever increasing number of international passengers entering the United States, coupled with demands for ever more vigilant border security, it is critical that Customs and Border Protection continue to expand and train to meet new challenges.  As outlined by the December 2011 GAO report on Border Security, additional steps are still needed; however the CBP has risen to meet many of those challenges already and can meet the remaining items with appropriate funding ¹⁹.  The CBP’s mission is to safeguard America’s homeland, protect American citizens from acts of terrorism and enforce the laws of the United States of America. 

We proudly do this with vigilance, integrity and professionalism and with an understanding that we are on the front lines of the Global War on Terror.

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Executive Briefing on Fire and Explosion at Atlas Castings and Technology

Executive Briefing

Executive Briefing on Fire and Explosion at Atlas Castings and Technology

Richard Hildreth

EDMG 240 – Chemistry of Hazardous Materials

December 29, 2013

Note: This paper is written from the prospective of an executive briefing presented to the Tacoma City Council on this event. The purpose is to provide the Council with background of this event and demonstrate the critical need of adequate resources to protect the citizens of Tacoma from similar type events.

Executive Briefing on Fire and Explosion at Atlas Castings and Technology

Part I – The Fire, Explosion and Aftermath:

When handling any Hazardous Material, situational awareness and proper staffing, training and equipment are critical for safety.  Even the slightest mistake could result in any incident becoming a catastrophic event. A prime example of this is the October 2007 fire and explosion of a propane truck at the Atlas Castings and Technology (formerly Atlas Foundry) in Tacoma, Washington. At approximately 3:00 PM. while transferring liquid propane from a tanker truck to stationary tanks a sudden blowout of propane vapors made its way inside the foundry and was ignited.  The initial flash type explosion seriously injured the driver; however he was able to stumble almost 200’ to a perimeter fence and was taken to a hospital. Unfortunately, as a result of serious internal injuries, he died four days later. The subsequent explosion, which is known as a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion or BLEVE created a fireball that went over 1000 feet into the air and tossed one of the axles of the tanker truck, still on fire onto the elevated  State Route 16 (highway) overpass (Duryee & Romano, 2007). This overpass is almost 150 feet in elevation above the valley floor and almost 1000 feet away from the explosion. During this event, power was knocked out for over 13,000 customers when debris destroyed a Tacoma City Light Substation and the shell of the truck’s propane tank itself landed on power lines over 500 feet away (Vane, Eskenazi, & Perry, 2007).  The explosion was felt more than 20 miles away. Fear of additional BLEVEs of one or both of the two 30,000 gallon stationary tanks demanded firefighters take a defensive approach to the incident and is evidence why situational awareness at these types of events is always critical.

What makes this incident a great case study is the amount of video that is available of the incident prior to, during and following the incident and explosion. A security camera located just north of the incident shows the truck and driver, a sudden burst of Propane Vapors and 34 seconds later the initial explosion (KOMO News, Oct 15, 2007).  Although the security camera was damaged before the subsequent explosions, Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) cameras and private video taken by witnesses show the explosive power of this event (KOMO News, Oct. 6, 2007). A link to one of these videos, now used in case studies along with specific details is provided later in this report.  The video shows both the fire and the BLEVE from a vantage point approximately 2000 feet away, on Sprague Avenue near the intersection with Highway 18.

This event began with the delivery of propane by Chuck McDonald, a 64 year old driver employed by IXL Transport Services of Molalla, Ore. McDonald was in the process of transferring 11,000 gallons of liquid propane to two 30,000 gallon stationary bulk storage tanks (McClary, 2008).  Both stationary tanks were connected together by liquid and vapor transfer lines designed to allow transfer between tanks and/or simultaneous filling. As per regulations, each storage tank had pressure relief devices located on the top of each tank (Lewis, 2011). As it will be shown later, these pressure relief valves played an important role in the response and recovery of this incident.  Upon the tanker truck’s arrival at the facility, it was discovered that fittings on the liquid delivery line had separated from the hose and would require repair prior to offloading of product.  These repairs were attempted by the driver and three Atlas Foundry workers, none of whom had specific training for repairs of high pressure lines. Repairs were made using items found on site including several hose clamps and pins not rated for use on high pressure equipment. These repairs failed following activation of the Power Take Off (PTO) unit used to pressurize the transfer from the truck to the tank assembly. The security camera video clearly showed the driver, Chuck McDonald, hooking up this repaired hose to the truck, activating the PTO and walking towards the stationary tanks to open the Globe valves on the tank intake manifold. The truck was soon rapidly surrounded with a cloud of highly volatile propane vapors.  These vapors found their way into the foundry and 34 seconds later were ignited by an electric arc furnace inside the foundry causing the initial fire and flash type explosion. 

Adding to the series of events that led to this event was the failure of an internal liquid shutoff valve on the tanker truck. This valve located inside the transportation cargo tank was designed to monitor actual flow rate against a preset safe flow rate.  As designed in the event of a rupture or pipe break, the valve should have closed without human interaction within 20 seconds. An additional safety device, a thermally activated valve rated at 250 F also should have closed, shutting off the fuel supply from the fire. These failures allowed fuel to feed the fire resulting in a BLEVE approximately seven minutes later. 

A You Tube video published on the My Fire Fighter Nation website shows the initial fire with flames shooting hundreds of feet in the air. A link to this video can be found at http://my.firefighternation.com/video/889755:Video:115488 .

At approximately the 30 second mark of the video, emergency vehicle sirens can be heard responding (This would be approximately 3 minutes after the initial explosion) and even from this location, an estimated 2000 feet northwest of the event, the roar of the fire itself can be heard. It should be noted that at the 1:27 mark in the video Emergency Response Vehicles can be seen in the background establishing a perimeter (this engine would be blocking traffic on South Tacoma Way south east of the fire). At the 2:08 mark small explosions believed to be the tires on the truck can be heard exploding. At the 4:15 mark the BLEVE occurs creating a fireball that some people estimate was over 1000 feet in the air. It was this explosion that tossed one of the truck axles onto the elevated freeway overpass (Hwy 16). That overpass would be immediately to the right of the view shown in the video. Other debris landed on Interstate 5 seen in the background.

The regional impacts of this event were enormous. The Washington State Patrol immediately closed both Interstate 5 and SR 16 causing massive backups that impacted traffic for hours. The Federal Aviation Administration banned aircraft within five miles requiring a reroute of aircraft taking off from SeaTac Airport. As previously stated, debris from this explosion destroyed a Tacoma City Light substation located 500 feet away knocking power out to over 13,000 customers until the area could be isolated and power restored.

In response of the BLEVE, Tacoma Fire Department dispatched 20 trucks and 50 firefighters to the scene.  Additionally, Tacoma Police were dispatched to secure a perimeter of approximately ¼ mile. As a result of firsthand information from the evacuating workers and the fact the two stationary tanks could still erupt, the Incident Commander pulled firefighters back to a defensive position. He ordered Tacoma Police to expand the exclusion zone and evacuate the neighborhood including homes near where the previous video was taken.

Because of plant layout, visual assessment of the scene was difficult; however, by rotating an elevated closed circuit camera operated by WSDOT located on the Highway 16 overpass the command staff were able to gain visual observation of the stationary tanks and scene.  They could visually see flames erupting from the pressure relief valves located atop each tank and what appeared to be an active fire beneath the tanks fueled by a ruptured natural gas line.  As Puget Sound Energy worked to shut off flow to the ruptured line, firefighters positioned three trucks with remote controlled water cannons within 150 feet of the fire and directed streams of water to cool the tanks to avoid additional BLEVE’s.  Care was taken to use indirect water spray to allow the fire from the relief valves to continue to burn as this was safely allowing pressure to reduce while burning off the vapor. An additional reason to use indirect water spray is that icing could occur around the valves and safety devices, causing additional hazards or failures. To keep tanks of this size cool a minimum of 512 gallons per minute are needed based on the formula 5 x Sq. Root of the Capacity in US Gallons (Emergency Response Guide, 2012, p. 367).  By the conclusion of this operation over 4 million gallons of water were needed to cool these stationary tanks.

After Puget Sound Energy was able to cap off the ruptured natural gas line, firefighters extinguished the ground fire but allowed the venting propane tanks to continue to burn off vapor. The tanks were then flooded with inert gas and removed for disposal. Firefighters remained on scene for 24 hours to ensure all hotspots were extinguished.  Washington State Department of Transportation inspectors examined the freeway overpass for any potential damage and Highway 16 was reopened at approximately 2 AM, about 11 hours after the initial explosion. On Sunday morning investigators from the Tacoma Fire Department, Washington State Labor and Industries and the Washington State Patrol then went to work to assess the series of events that contributed to this event. Part II of this report will cover the results of their investigations.

Part II: The Investigation

In investigating the series of events that resulted in the fire and explosions at the Atlas Castings and Technology (formerly Atlas Foundry) Tacoma Fire, Labor and Industries and independent investigators looked over evidence including security camera documentation, fittings and the remnants of the tanker truck.  Based on these investigations, it can be safely assumed the series of events being reported resulted in the BLEVE and the death of the tanker truck driver, Charles McDonald.  As this case may still result in both official and civil litigation, nothing in this report is provided with the intent of assigning blame, but rather to provide an executive overview of known facts.

The transportation and handling of all hazardous material, including propane is regulated by the US Department of Transportation and in Washington State is enforced by the Washington State Patrol. All drivers are subject to rigorous training and certification which is required to be updated every three years. All evidence points to the certifications for the driver Charles McDonald being current and valid at the time of this event. Additionally, there were no reports of recent citations of the driver or the vehicle involved.

It should be pointed out that propane gas is approximately 1.5 times denser than air. As a result, propane vapor clouds will stay relatively close to the ground and sink into open ditches, sewers and other low spots. It is considered highly flammable with a flashpoint of 155 F and a burning temperature of over 940 F.  At an ambient temperature of 60 degree Fahrenheit, liquid propane has a density of approximately 4.2 pounds per gallon. As Propane’s boiling point is just over 43 degrees Fahrenheit at atmospheric pressure, and this boiling point increases as pressure rises, liquid propane must be stored in pressurized containers or tanks to maintain liquid form.  When a pressurized propane tank is exposed to fire such as was seen in this incident, the liquid propane is heated above its boiling point causing the propane to convert from liquid to gaseous form causing an increase in pressure. Additionally, as propane is heated, the liquid expands at a rate of 1.5% per 10 F of temperature rise. This conversion as well as the expansion of liquid rapidly causes the pressure inside the tank to rise. Typically when this occurs, pressure relief devices allow for the controlled release of excess pressure. However when this pressure exceeds the critical limits of the tank, a catastrophic rupture could occur; this rupture results in two things, the sudden explosive release of the gas and the almost instantaneous vaporization of the remaining liquid to gaseous form (Bachman, 2005). Although BLEVE’s are not limited to failures of containers containing flammable materials, in cases such as these when they do, the sudden release of flammable gas often results in a fireball like the one seen on October 7^th. Additional hazards from LPG type BLEVEs include thermal radiation, projectiles from the explosion and secondary fires caused by burning material (Emergency Response Guide, 2012, p. 364).

In transferring liquid propane from a tanker truck to a fixed or stationary storage tank the transfer is accomplished with the use of two separate pressure rated hoses, the first for delivery of the liquid propane and the second to allow vapors to return to the truck.  Each hose should be rated at a minimum of 1700 PSI with fittings designed for both the pressure and to resist any corrosive or erosive impacts of movement of pressurized material.  Additionally, multiple safety features including automatic shut off valves are used in hopes of preventing the type of event discussed in this report.

When the field repaired hose connection on the transfer line failed, it enveloped the truck in a white cloud of propane gas. This cloud stayed relatively close to the ground and followed a drainage gutter approximately 75 feet and made its way inside the building. It is believed this cloud was ignited by an Electric Arc furnace located inside resulting in the initial explosion. There were two minor explosions followed by the BLEVE approximately 7 minutes into the event.  It was as a result of this BLEVE that most of the physical damage occurred including launching pieces of the tanker truck hundreds of feet into the air and as far away as one half mile from the explosion.

Kevin Lewis of Case Forensics who also investigated the cause of the BLEVE noted in his report that the recovered globe valves on the stationary tanks were in the closed position which prevented propane from these tanks to add more fuel to the fire.  The position of the thermally activated valve on the truck was also in the closed position; however based on the video footage and other indications it appears the BLEVE triggered the closure of the valve post incident. In the CASE report it was noted that there were several design flaws in the valve in question. These flaws included the nylon plunger that was triggered by the fusible link, lacked sufficient force to push the release lever while under pressure.  The CASE report concluded” an appropriate safety factor was not incorporated in the selection of an emergency safety device on an internal valve. A redesign of the valve further decreased the likelihood that the safety device could function to prevent a catastrophic event, such as a BLEVE from occurring.”

The Washington State Labor and Industries has issued a citation to Atlas Castings and Technology citing three serious violations of workplace safety and health regulations (Labor and Industries, 2008).  A fourth violation, not having a remote shutoff valve on the stationary tanks was not considered to be a factor in this incident nor did it contribute to the explosion. The four violations are listed below.

·         Not properly training employees on the repair and maintenance of pressurized LP-gas systems.

·         Using hose connections that were not rated for LP-gas service and would not withstand the pressure.

·         Not testing the repaired hose after assembly to ensure it was free from leaks under normal use.

·         Not having a shutoff valve with means of remote control to protect against uncontrolled discharge of LP gas from piping close to the point where the piping and hose connected.

Atlas Castings & Technology is appealing the citations making the following comments on each citation:

·         The first concludes that Atlas failed to train two employees on the repair and maintenance of the propane system. The foundry contends these were not the employees’ duties, and that they would not have tried to fix the system had they not been urged and directed to do so by McDonald.

·         A second citation faults Atlas for using hose couplings that would not withstand the minimum pressure required. Atlas says the agency did not conduct performance testing to validate this opinion, and the use of the couplings was the responsibility of the driver.

·         A third citation blames the foundry for not testing the hose after the attempted repairs, but Atlas states that its employees did not place the hose into use before the tests could occur, because that was McDonald’s responsibility.

·         The final citation finds Atlas responsible for not providing a backflow-prevention device closer to the site where the delivery hose was connected. However, the foundry stated, the evidence “shows that the system did have a backflow device in place. The backflow device was installed along with the original system in the early 1950s, at which time it was in full compliance with the then current codes and no upgrades have since been required.”

It is the foundry’s position that the driver was in violation of both Federal and State regulations when he failed to red tag the delivery hose and immediately take it out of service. It should be pointed out that the Department of Labor and Industries investigation was limited to Atlas Castings itself and that the Department does not have jurisdiction over the truck or the driver.

In conclusion I wish to emphasize the fact that events such as this are resource dependent and impossible to prepare for.  As was shown this type of event can occur as a result of seemingly minor mistakes but can have tragic or in this case explosive results. This is why it is so critical to maintain operational readiness in the Tacoma Fire Department.  We understand why cuts in staffing have been considered and we agree that in these times of reduced revenues that each of us needs to tighten the belt. What we cannot afford is to reduce our ability to respond to unexpected events such as was seen October 7, 2007.  Continuous training, up-to-date equipment and most of all the manpower needed to respond for multiple operational periods is critical to the safety and security of our community.

We recognize how difficult your job is, to craft an austere budget without creating more risk.  We wanted to bring to your attention some intangible facts that should be considered in your deliberations. It is our hope that this executive briefing will illustrate how critical our resources are. As stated at the beginning, when handling any Hazardous Material, situational awareness and proper staffing, training and equipment are critical for safety. We must maintain our capability to safely respond to any event that threatens the safety and wellbeing of our citizens.

Works Cited

Atlas Foundry Explosion from WSDOT Cam at SR16 & Union Ave. (2007, October 10).
Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nAddMqVzrO0
Note this video was used as part of a broadcast on KOMO news 4 in
Seattle Washington.

Atlas Foundry Explosion - Tacoma, WA. (2007, October 8). Retrieved from Fire
Fighter Nation website: http://my.firefighternation.com/video/
889755:Video:115488

Atlas Will Appeal Citations Following Deadly Explosion. (2008, April 6).
Foundry Management and Technology. Retrieved from http://foundrymag.com/
testingqc/atlas-will-appeal-citations-following-deadly-explosion

Bachman, E. G. (2005, March 1). Propane Explosion: A Case Study. Retrieved from
Fire Engineering website: http://www.fireengineering.com/articles/print/
volume-158/issue-3/features/propane-explosion-a-case-study.html

Duryee, T., & Romano, B. J. (2007, October 7). Foundry blast jars Tacoma.
Seattle Times. Retrieved from http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/
2003930997_explode07m0.html

Emergency Response Guide (USDOT PHMSA, Comp.). (2012). Retrieved from
http://phmsa.dot.gov/staticfiles/PHMSA/DownloadableFiles/Files/Hazmat/
ERG2012.pdf

KOMO News. (2007, October 6). Huge explosion at Tacoma foundry felt for miles
around [Video file]. Retrieved from http://www.komonews.com/news/local/
10288352.html?tab=video&c=y

KOMO News. (2007, October 15). New video shows events that led to foundry
explosion [Video file]. Retrieved from http://www.komonews.com/news/
local/10560846.html?tab=video&c=y

Labor and Industries, Atlas Foundry cited for October explosion, (Wash. 2008).
Retrieved from http://www.lni.wa.gov/news/2008/pr080404a.asp

Lewis, K. H. (2011). Safety device failure results in tanker BLEVE at Atlas
Foundries. Retrieved from CASE Forensics website:
http://www.case4n6.com/page.php?getpage=CASEofthequarter

McClary, D. C. (2008, April 29). Explosion and fire at Atlas Castings and
Technology in Tacoma kills truck driver and injures three workers on
October 6, 2007. Retrieved from HistoryLink.org website:
http://www.historylink.org/index.cfm?DisplayPage=output.cfm&file_id=8612

Peterson, D. F. (2002, April 1). BLEVE: Facts, Risk Factors, and Fallacies.
Retrieved from FireEngineering.com website: http://www.fireengineering.com/ articles/print/volume-155/issue-4/features/ bleve-facts-risk-factors-and-fallacies.html

Vane, L., Eskenazi, S., & Perry, N. (2007, October 8). The Tacoma blast "It's
amazing there were not more" hurt. Seattle Times. Retrieved from
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2003932895_explode08m.html

The Rise and Fall of Arrogance

The Rise and Fall of Arrogance

The decline and fall of President Richard M Nixon was not just a result of criminal investigations; it was also a result of his own arrogance. Although he accomplished many great things as President, his subversion of power, obstruction of justice and his final fall from grace will always taint his accomplishments.  But as Anthony Summers describes in his biography of the President, Watergate was just the culmination of years of arrogance and political manipulation ¹.

Richard Nixon began his political career in 1946 winning a Seat in Congress by painting his opponent as a communist. He soon came to national prominence as a member of the United States House Committee on Un-American Activities led by Senator Joseph McCarthy and his pursuit of Alger Hiss, the US State Department official accused of spying for the USSR. An avowed foe to communism, in 1950 he won election to the US Senate, also by labeling his opponent as communist.  In fact he even referred to her as “The Pink Lady ².”  In an interesting twist of politics, fellow Congressman John F Kennedy presented Nixon with a check for $1000.00 from his father, who shared Nixon’s aversion to communism ³. Because of Nixon hiring an unscrupulous campaign manager and as a result of what she called many dirty tricks, his opponent, Democratic Congresswoman Helen Gahagan Douglas is credited with first coining the term Tricky Dick to describe Nixon.

In 1952, this rising star in the Republican Party was tagged to run as Vice President to General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Soon after, Nixon’s arrogance started to show when he was accused of diverting $18,000 in gifts from a California businessman to his own personal use. In what is now known as the Checkers Speech, when he went on National TV and admitted that he took the money; however he claimed it went to pay for political expenses that he felt the American Public should not have to pay not for personal use.  He stated it went to pay for trips back and forth from California to DC, publish political speeches and for other political uses ⁴. He also made claims that the entire flap over the issue was a result of a communist conspiracy to keep him out of the Executive branch. Although the fund was technically not direct violation of Senate rules at the time, it would currently be prohibited under campaign and ethics laws. The public overlooked his admitted moral failings and elected him as Vice President in 1952 and again in 1956, ten years after his first run for Congress.

In 1960, Vice President Nixon was nominated by the Republican Party to run against his former supporter Senator John Fitzgerald Kennedy. Many people contribute his loss to the September debate where he looked pale and sickly compared to Kennedy, but following the loss he claimed he was a victim of the Kennedy campaign’s ruthlessness, corruption and dirty tricks.  His book Six Crises further made some of these same claims while painting his actions and political career as a proud and patriotic journey ⁵. His arrogance would not allow him to accept blame.

Following his 1962 loss in a race for Governor of California, Nixon made his now famous quote “You won't have Dick Nixon to kick around anymore." As he had in the past, he blamed others for his loss as the reason he lost to incumbent Pat Brown. In his final press conference following that race he placed the blamed for the loss on the press and stated:

"I leave you gentleman now and you will write it. You will interpret it. That's your right. But as I leave you I want you to know — just think how much you're going to be missing. You won't have Nixon to kick around anymore, because, gentlemen, this is my last press conference. ⁶" 

Although most people considered this the end of his political career, in 1968 Richard Nixon received the nomination and subsequent election as the 37^th President of the United States.

Shortly after his election, he used a tactic similar to his Checkers Speech to quell opposition to his position on the Vietnam War.  He again went on National television claiming he was the victim of long standing enemies in the liberal East Coast Media.  He claimed that truth was being twisted by one sided coverage and that his policy of a gradual withdrawal was needed to prevent a Communist victory and to not show weakness to China or Russia. In this speech he called on what he termed “The Silent Majority” to rise up in his support and help him win the war and win the peace. The result was an outpouring of letters of support that bolstered Nixon’s ego but did nothing to change the media coverage of the still escalating war in Vietnam ⁷.

Almost from the beginning, the Nixon administration was plagued by leaks. In May 1969, a story revealing secret bombing campaigns in Cambodia was published in the New York Times. In June 1971 the same paper published the first excerpt of what became known as the Pentagon Papers. In response President Nixon ordered the FBI to tap more than a dozen phones in order to find who was leaking information.  When those wiretaps did not stop the leaks, he ordered the formation of a special investigations unit nicknamed the plumbers, for their task was to stop leaks. It was members of this unit that broke into the offices of psychiatrist Daniel Ellsberg and the Democratic National Party headquarters located at the Watergate Hotel in Washington DC.

When hush money was discovered as well as links to the Campaign to Reelect the President (CREEP) to the burglars arrested placing bugs in the DNC headquarters, a series of events that ultimately led to President Nixon’s resignation were set in motion. Although it is widely agreed that President Nixon had not ordered the break in or even had prior knowledge, he did order the FBI to stop its investigation which by itself constituted obstruction. In spite of his reelection in 1972, as information of his involvement finally became public, Nixon’s Presidency began to unravel.

On most nights, the lead story on the nightly news concerned Watergate; multiple investigations, ongoing  coverage by the Washington Post citing a close source to the administration known only as Deep Throat and persistent Congressional inquiries captured the minds of the public. Following the guilty pleas of five of the so called Watergate Seven, and the conviction of the remaining two in January 1972, the issue appeared at first to settle down but was not only resurrected, but the lid was blown off in March by a letter sent to Judge John Sirica.

James McChord, a former CIA agent and the Security Director for CREEP admitted in a letter to Judge Sirica that the court had been deliberately misled in an attempt to distance the White House from the scandal. He claimed that the Watergate seven committed perjury at the insistence of White House Council John Dean and former Attorney General John Mitchell. The pressure on President Nixon only increases and turns again to the American Public with a televised speech. In this speech he announces the dismissal or resignation of several key White House and Administration positions and the naming of Elliot Richardson as the new Attorney General. He also claimed complete ignorance of the cover-ups and his deep and personal sorrow that people close to him could have been involved in the Watergate affair.  He again used the tactic that worked so well with the Checker’s Speech, admitting something wrong occurred and asking the American Public to understand that he would do everything in his power to make sure it never happens again. As master of persuasive appeal, he again attempted to pull the American public to his side with the following excerpt ⁸:

“For the fact that alleged improper actions took place within the White House or within my campaign organization, the easiest course would be for me to blame those to whom I delegated the responsibility to run the campaign. But that would be a cowardly thing to do.

I will not place the blame on subordinates—on people whose zeal exceeded their judgment and who may have done wrong in a cause they deeply believed to be right.”

Eleven months to the day after the public first learned of Watergate break-in, On May 18, 1973 live televised hearings of the Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities began including over 250 hours of testimony by many involved directly with the scandal ⁹. On May 25^th, an independent Special Prosecutor, Archibald Cox was appointed by the Justice Department to oversee the investigation into the cover-up. In his testimony to the Senate Committee, former White House Council John Dean states he had multiple conversations with the President over Watergate and that the President was involved in the cover up within days of the burglary.  He also detailed additional political espionage that the White House had been involved in. One of the final straws was testimony by a former Whitehouse aide who revealed the existence of a secret taping system that was set up in the Oval Office. When Archibald Cox, the Special Prosecutor subpoenaed the tapes, Nixon refused to cooperate and then promptly fired Mr. Cox.

On August 15, 1973, Nixon again appealed directly to the American Public in a televised speech announcing he was releasing edited transcripts of these tapes claiming that unedited transcripts might threaten Executive Privilege and National Security. After a series of court battles that all went against President Nixon, the President offered a compromise of allowing Democratic Senator John Stennis be allowed to review the tapes and report the contents to Cox. When this was rejected he then ordered Attorney General Elliot Richardson to fire Special Prosecutor Cox. When the AG instead resigned, he ordered Deputy AG William Ruckelshaus to do the same who then also promptly resigned. President Nixon then appointed Solicitor General Robert Bork as acting AG who then fired Special Prosecutor Cox. Three days later, President Nixon reluctantly releases some of the tapes.

On November 21, 1973, an 18 ½ minute gap in a taped conversation between President Nixon and Eric Haldeman is disclosed. Electronics experts claimed the gaps were the result of multiple erasures and most likely did not occur accidently as the White House tried to claim. By January, Congress seriously begins to consider the possibility of impeachment.

As the investigation starts to build towards a possible impeachment, new Special Prosecutor Ron Jaworski subpoenas the remaining 64 tapes and again Nixon refuses to cooperate. In another live speech to the American Public, he announces that he will release edited transcripts that he himself has reviewed as relevant to the case. He then went on for over 30 minutes denying his involvement, blaming Dean and others and laying out the case how he was the victim of political witch-hunts.

On July 27, 1973 the House Judiciary Committee votes 27-11 to forward Articles of Impeachment on the Count of Obstruction of the Investigation. On July 29^th, they voted on the Second Article, Misuse of Power and Violation of His Oath of Office. The next day the Third and final article concerning his failure to comply with subpoenas was issued. On August 5^th, the transcripts tapes recorded a week following the break-in, including what was in the missing 18 ½ minutes gap is released.  With this release there is clear and compelling evidence that Nixon ordered the cover up including ordering the FBI to halt its investigation.  This convinces the 11 Republican members who were hold outs on impeachment to change their votes and forward all three Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.

On August 08, 1974, Nixon held his last nationwide broadcast as President.  In this broadcast he announced to a weary nation: “and so, effective at noon tomorrow, I shall resign my Presidency”. The following day he left Washington DC, not to fade into history. The following month, President Ford pardoned Richard Nixon for any and all crimes he may have committed effectively ending any remaining investigations.

In what some people saw as an attempt to save his legacy, former President Nixon agreed to a series of twelve interviews by British journalist David Frost.  These candid interviews were broadcast in four 90 minute segments in May, 1977. In the third segment, Nixon made the statement that many people feel best revealed his arrogance; in response to David Frost’s question about if he had in fact committed illegal acts, he commented “Well, when the president does it, that means that it is not illegal, ¹⁰”

Although Richard M Nixon will always be remembered for the Watergate Scandal, it was not the only demon that the President had in his memory.  Some people have made claims about mental illness ¹¹; others believe it was his lust for power that drove him to do what he did.  History has shown that he was capable of the crimes he was accused of; however his arrogance often led him to believe he was above the law and that his goals were more important to the nation than the law he had to bend or break to achieve it. Although he did accomplish many great things in office, his legacy will always be tainted, not just from criminal activity, but from his own arrogance.

Bibliography

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