Terrorism and CBRNE Awareness Education - Essay

 

 

 

 

 

 

Terrorism and CBRNE Awareness Education

Richard Hildreth

American Military University #4089144

HLSS 211 - Emergency Response to Terrorism

Professor Michael Thornal

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Terrorism and CBRNE Awareness Education

Few people would disagree that if given the opportunity, there are terrorists who would be willing to use CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive) weapons on American soil. History has shown that Al-Qaida and other groups have experimented with or attempted to obtain CBRNE weapons. It is believed that at least from a knowledge standpoint, they may be capable of delivery and we are lucky to have not already faced multiple CBRNE events.  When such an event does occur, the impact may reach far beyond the footprint of the attack itself; fear, frustration, anger and disruption of normal life will work as a force multiplier and extend the impacts across the nation.  This is why, as part of our overall national preparedness, a realistic training program on terrorism and CBRNE weapons is important. In addition to the DHS funded training programs such as those taught at the Center for Domestic Preparedness (http://cdp.dhs.gov/) in Anniston Alabama, entry level training programs that stress the need for CBRNE preparedness need to be developed.  We can have the best preparedness and training programs in the world; if we do not get the right people to recognize the scope of the problem these great training programs can never truly be effective.

CBRNE Awareness training of responders, business and government leaders as well as civilian volunteers can help mitigate the threat and impact of CBRNE events.  This training should include recognition of the threat itself, understanding of the impacts of an attack and recognition of what may be vulnerable as a target. The training must stress critical thinking, not be limited to tactics of conventional warfare and provide just enough detail to demonstrate how critical CBRNE preparedness is.  If this awareness training gets too detailed, it is possible that participants will lose interest or feel the training is too complicated for them to understand.  The training should not be teaching participants what to think, as the threat itself is constantly evolving; instead it should be encouraging participants to think out of the box as the next attack may be asymmetrical in nature.  As the 9/11 Commission stated in its final report, the acts of September 11, 2001 was “a failure of imagination” (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004).  We can never again allow that type of failure to threaten the United States of America.

Terrorism itself is defined in 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 as “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (FBI General Functions, 1969).  It could be domestic in origin, committed on US soil by US residents; or it could be international in origin, funded or conducted by any number of extremist organizations who normally operate outside of US borders.  Unlike acts of war, targets of terrorism events are often civilians and the events are not conducted by state or government sponsored military units.  We cannot allow preconceived notions to limit our perspective of who a terrorist might be.  Realistic discussion of what terrorism is needs to be part of this CBRNE awareness training.

Too often when the word “terrorism” is used, people will automatically think of Islamic Fundamentalist and forget that is only one facet of the terrorism threat. It is true that groups like Al-Qaida (AQ) and Islamic Jihad Group (IJU) are Islamic terrorist organizations ("Counter Terrorism 2013 Calendar," 2012), but they are not the only organizations promoting terrorist acts on US soil.  US born organizations motivated by political, religious, environmental or other issues have been known to commit acts of terror on US soil and can be expected to do so again (United States Air Force, 2004).  Recognizing who the terrorist might be and what their motivational factors are is critical in any training program. Perceptions of ideology and motivation are important factors in determining possible targets and vulnerabilities. It should be remembered that most people of Islamic faith are not jihadist. Just like most environmental activists would never think about committing an act of terrorism. The fact is, even inside many activist organizations and communities, acts of terrorism are often disdained (Smith, R. K. 38:2). Too often, people will overreact to legitimate protest, blame innocent ethnic communities and paint entire organizations or populations as terrorist.  A problem this creates is the alienation of members of a community that might otherwise be willing to provide information that could help stop a real act.  Recognition of who the terrorists are and more importantly are not is a critical part of any awareness program.

The type of target selected can often be predicted by the overall objectives of an individual or group. Politically motivated groups or individuals will more likely chose highly symbolic targets such as government buildings, banks and multinational corporations. Groups like ALF (Animal Liberation Front) and ELF (Earth Liberation Front) might choose a university research laboratory or a large scale development. In trying to promote political, religious or social change, a soft target may also be chosen primarily to inject fear, hopelessness and a feeling that government cannot protect them.  The ability to perceive motivational factors is a key aspect of mitigating threats (Hildreth, 2013).  This discussion needs to be a part of the CBRNE awareness training.

Recognition of vulnerabilities and symbolism is also a critical part of this training.  Large manufacturing, power plants, critical infrastructure and places of assembly all have certain aspects that make them attractive as a target; however targets that also have some symbolic relationship raise their attractiveness. As an example, if reports are received warning that  a local Neo Nazi organization, is planning an attack on April 20 (Adolph Hitler’s birthday) it would make sense that likely targets might include a Jewish Synagogue or a location promoting the mixing of races.  If a report is received that Al-Qaida wants to attack the US in revenge for the death of Osama Bin Laden, additional measures around likely targets might be considered around the first week of May. A target might not be chosen with the purpose of killing the most number of civilians but rather to cause severe economic, social and physiological impact.  Every target is not going to be a high level visible target such as the World Trade Center. In a world where asymmetric targets and warfare is used, creativity and critical thinking is essential in planning (Kolodzie, 2001). The training program should be written to promote this level of analysis.

Currently, most communities lack the capacity to adequately deal with the consequences of a CBRNE attack. We lack enough trained personnel, even combining all federal and private resources (Franco & Bouri, 2010).  Education programs can help leverage the limited resources if communities take advantage of the programs available. The purpose of this CBRNE awareness training would be to expose responders and leadership to the real threats and vulnerabilities in hopes they will then reflect on their own capabilities.

This program should follow the proven adult education concepts of combining lecture with exercise and group activities. It should be a realistic discussion of the challenges they might have in conducting a CBRNE attack, while tempered with the reality that many of these challenges can be overcome by determined individuals. In addition to discussions, participants should have the opportunity to practice what they have learned in exercises using dramatic yet plausible scenarios. Prior to September 11, 2001, few people would have thought of terrorists flying commercial airliners into the World Trade Center and Pentagon as a viable threat. The following scenarios are examples taken from Homeland Security Table Top exercises. This training should include exercises that cause the participant to consider the impacts of worst case scenarios. They should stress how terrorist events might use events to create paralyzing fear and disruption of services. The following are two examples of Table Top Exercises currently under development.

(Note: both of these Scenarios are original materials being used for TTX exercises to be developed.  Scenario 1 would be used for a class similar to what I teach at EMI.  Scenario 2 would be used for a local Seattle based exercise.)

Scenario 1- Chemical Attack:

A terrorist cell, loosely affiliated with Al-Qaida of the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is believed to be planning an attack to coincide with the anniversary of the September 11^th terror attacks. Possible targets are unknown but the cell is believed to possess large amounts of potassium cyanide and sulfuric acid. Three members of this cell were last seen driving north on US 107 from Fisherville, located in Liberty County, State of Columbia.

A school district work van pulls into the parking lot of John Chapman Elementary School located on K and 3^rd Ave in Central City.  Two men get out wearing what appears to be maintenance uniforms and proceed to an HVAC unit located on a lower roof. The workmen access the air intake system on one of the units and install a device that upon command will allow liquid sulfuric acid to mix with crystalized potassium cyanide.  The unit produces hydrogen cyanide gas at a concentration of about 5600 ppm and is ingested into the school’s air conditioning system. The men exit the roof, walk quickly to the work van and drive off.

Inside the classroom the first hints of something wrong is the faint odor of almonds.  The first symptoms are an increased heart rate and restlessness of the teachers and children located in the classroom directly underneath the HVAC unit. Some students soon complain about headaches, while others appear giddy and intoxicated.  Shortly thereafter the teacher and five children collapse and a panicked classroom of children down the hall towards the main office. Other classrooms appear to be suffering similar issues.

After a period of confusion the school notifies authorities and evacuates the school.  It is noticed that of the estimated 300 students and 39 staff on campus that morning, less than half appear to be out of the school. As responders enter the school, initial tests show a concentration of 50 mg/m³ near the entrance and higher concentrations of 200 mg/m³ near the first classroom.  Responders also notice 12 adults and 65 children collapsed in the hallway, some dead and some suffering severe respiratory problems.  Additional victims, 3 adults and 15 more children are dead in the first two classrooms.  A group of 20 students and a teacher are found in the library huddled in a corner; although some exhibit symptoms of poisoning concentrations were less than 30 mg/m³ and everyone is safe.

 

Key Talking Points:

·         Would this be seen as an effective attack?  Why?

·         How viable would an attack like this be on a school or other soft target in your jurisdiction?

·         What would be the impact in your jurisdiction if this event was to happen elsewhere in the nation?

·         What would be the impact on your responders if this was to happen in your jurisdiction?

·         What steps could be done to reduce the vulnerability of this school?

 

Instructors Notes:

·         An event like this would result in panic across this nation; if we cannot protect our children against a chemical attack like this then no one is safe. 

·         A natural impact across this nation would be paralyzing fear and a reluctance to allow children to go to school.  Additionally children themselves would have unreasonable fear as they have more difficulty separating actual vulnerability from imagination. 

·         Responders would most likely need counseling. Some could suffer from severe depression and possibly suicide. 

·         The unfortunate reality is there is little that could be done to prevent this type of attack.  Some mitigation such as locked access to HVAC units could be used; however it would be difficult to prevent access.

NOTE: Concentrations and effects of gas courtesy of Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (Hydrogen Cyanide, 2010).

 

 

Scenario 2 – Dirty Bomb

Part One

The Port of Seattle and the Department of Homeland Security has spent millions of dollars installing security, radiation detectors and other equipment in the 5 waterfront terminals located in King County, Washington. Like other port districts across the nation, concerns over the possibility of a dirty bomb being brought into the United States in a shipping container have resulted in multi-layer screening of shipping containers.  These screenings include inspections at port of origin, while in transit and in port. The concerns are centered on the possibility of a radiological weapon being detonated in one of America’s major ports and the world wide impacts that might have on international trade (Rosoff & von Winterfeldt, 2007, p. 536).

Key Talking Points:

·         What impacts could be expected if a Radiological Device was detonated in the Port of Seattle?

·         How would this disrupt International trade?

·         What would the economic impacts of this event be?

·         Are there any weaknesses in the security system that could be improved to prevent this type of event?  At what cost?

 

Part Two

Shortly after 8 AM, a driver approaches Terminal 47 near downtown Seattle with a container being shipped from the Midwest to China.  The container was picked up at the nearby rail switching yard by a contract driver. All shipping documents appear to be correct and the driver is directed to a row of containers to await loading onto an outgoing ship.

At 10:04 a remote detonation device triggers a blasting cap inside the container and detonates 2000 pounds of ANFO (Ammonium Nitrate - Fuel Oil) mixture, surrounded by radiological medical waste; the radioactive material that was, at least on paper supposedly headed for proper disposal by an EPA registered contractor at Yucca Mountains, Nevada. 

The 2000 pounds of ANFO, detonates at a VOD (Velocity of Detonation) of over 12,000 fps ("Explosives - ANFO (Ammonium," 2011), and results in a blast area of ¼ mile (Introduction to Explosives, 2012, p.17).  Radioactive debris from the medical waste is scattered throughout waterfront area.  A plume of smoke and radioactive material drifts towards Pioneer Square and the SODO district of Seattle.

Key Points:

·         How would the impacts of this event be different than an incident from a ship side container?

·         How would this impact International Shipping?

·         What could the economic impacts of this event be?

Instructors Notes:

·         Economic impact of this event (not including decontamination) would be an estimated $200 million for a month long shut down.

·         Decontamination cost could be in the $10 - $100 million range

 

When the next CBRNE attack occurs on US soil, will we be prepared?  Will our responders have the proper training and equipment and will our policy leaders recognize the critical need for CBRNE preparedness? The purpose of training programs like the one proposed is to help move our nation in that direction. There will always be resistance from those individuals who suffer from the Ostrich Syndrome (Goldsmith, 1970).  To them it is easier to ignore the possibility and hope that it never occurs. We may never have 100% participation in preparedness or perception of the CBRNE threat: however every time this type of training convinces someone to prepare, that  moves us that much closer to being prepared. 

References:

Counter Terrorism 2013 Calendar. (2012, January 27). Retrieved from National Counter Terrorism Center website: http://www.nctc.gov/site/other/fto.html

Explosives - ANFO (Ammonium Nitrate - Fuel Oil). (2011, July 7). Retrieved from
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/explosives-anfo.htm

FBI General Functions, 28 C.F.R. § 0.85 (1969).

Franco, C., & Bouri, N. (2010, April 9). Feds Would Face Problems in a Bio
Attack Clean-Up: Analysis Reveals Progress but Some Gaps Remain. Retrieved
from Center for Biosecurity -University of Pittsburg Medical Center
website: http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/website/about_us/pressroom/archive/
2010-04-12_decon_report.html

Goldsmith, E. (1970, December 1). The Ostrich Syndrome [Speech transcript].
Retrieved from http://www.edwardgoldsmith.org/717/the-ostrich-syndrome/

Hildreth, R. (Presenter). (2013, March 5). Integrated Emergency Management
Class (IEMC) E-915. Lecture presented at Emergency Management Institute.

Hydrogen Cyanide. (2010). Retrieved from Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons website: http://www.opcw.org/about-chemical-weapons/
types-of-chemical-agent/blood-agents/hydrogen-cyanide/

Kolodzie, M. L. (2001, August). Commentary: the Asymmetric Threat. Retrieved from United States Military Academy - WestPoint website:
http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/JulAug01/MS628.htm

Rosoff, H., & von Winterfeldt, D. (2007). A Risk and Economic Analysis of Dirty
Bomb Attacks on the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. Society for Risk
Analysis, 27(3), 533-546. http://dx.doi.org /10.1111/ j.1539-6924.2007.00908.x

Smith, R. K. (issue 38:2). “Ecoterrorism”?: A Critical Analysis of the
Vilification of Radical Environmental Activists as Terrorists. Retrieved from Lewis and Clark Law School -Environmental law online website: http://www.elawreview.org/elaw/382/ ecoterrorism_a_critical_analys.html

Technical Resource for Incident Prevention: Introduction to Explosives. (2012).
Retrieved from Department of Homeland Security website:
http://info.publicintelligence.net/DHS-Explosives.pdf

The 9/11 Commission Report. (2004, August). Retrieved from National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States website:
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report_Exec.htm

United States Air Force. (2004). The Dynamic Terrorist Threat (Research Report No. F49642-01-C-0003) (K. Cragin & S. A. Daly, Authors). Retrieved from Rand website: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=

ELECTED AND POLICY LEADERS NEED TRAINING IN CBRNE RESPONCE -Essay

 

 

 

ELECTED AND POLICY LEADERS

NEED TRAINING IN CBRNE RESPONCE

 

 

 

 

 

Richard G. Hildreth

AMU Student # 4089144

HLSS 212 Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Hazards

Professor Bruce Knee – Instructor

December 21, 2012

 

One of the recommendations contained in the 9-11 Commission report is to identify, develop, test, and deliver training to state, local, and tribal emergency response providers. Although policy is not specifically identified as a typical responder discipline, it is important for local government officials such as Mayors, City Managers and Council Members to at least gain an awareness level training in emergency management and CBRNE threats. Even with the absence of an actual attack, the training of local government elected officials benefits our national and regional capacity by helping them recognize gaps in their own performance and their jurisdictions.

There are few greater tests of policy leadership than facing a disaster or CBRNE event.  Although not typically thought of as a performance standard for elected officials; an understanding of the CBRNE threat, the challenges it creates and what responders face in response can prove valuable during a response or in the development of emergency plans. Policy leaders who gain awareness training are better prepared to recognize the challenges responders face in CBRNE events.

There are a number of DHS funded training programs available through the National Domestic Preparedness Consortium ¹. These programs include awareness and performance level training on Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive events and in Weapons of Mass Destruction.  In addition to gaining an awareness of the threat and what is needed for response, governmental officials can also gain insight by participating in hands on training offered at the Center for Domestic Preparedness and The Energetic Materials Research and Testing Center (EMRTC) located at New Mexico Tech (NMT). Hands on training allow policy leaders to experience the environment that responders operate in and the challenges created working inside of Personal Protective Equipment. In the Chemical Ordinance Biological RAdiological  Training Facility (COBRAtf) located at the Center for Domestic Preparedness ², participants dress out in Level B and Level C personal protective equipment ³ and practice testing and operating inside of an actual toxic environment. This training allows participants to understand why certain types of equipment, gear and supplies might be needed and why specific processes are followed.

A typical program at the Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP) ⁴ that an elected official could benefit from would be (MGT 360) Incident Command: Capabilities, Planning and Response Actions for All Hazards combined with (PER 262 HOT) Hands-On Training for CBRNE Incidents ⁵. In this program participants would spend the first 3 days (of 5 days total) in a classroom setting discussing incident command, incident management, threat analysis, assessment and WMD planning and response.  This instruction would be a combination of lecture, group discussion and exercise culminating with participants playing positions similar to their real life roles in a functional exercise.  The fourth day would be dedicated to learning about their Personal Protective Equipment, use of testing equipment, rapid triage, evacuation and decontamination of victims, as well as the most critical item, Safety.

On the fifth day participants are bussed to the live agent facility (COBRAtf) in the hills above Anniston Alabama. This facility was home to the US Army’s Chemical Corps School before Fort McClellan was closed; it is now the only facility in the nation that nonmilitary responders can work and train with live nerve agents.  Just to get to the administration building you pass through two armed security gates and are under constant surveillance. Upon entering the administration building you head for one of the two classrooms where you receive a final briefing, medical checks and a fit test for your gas mask. 

For the first portion of the day’s training participants suit up in Level B PPE’s (Personal Protective Equipment) and are taken to an outdoors training area known as Northville.  At Northville, participants play responders to a CBRNE and are tasked with the evacuation of victims from just outside of a simulated Hot zone (3 zones are established around an event, the Hot zone which is the most contaminated, a transition or warm zone and an uncontaminated area or cold zone) through Gross Decontamination ⁶ and handed off to a team in the cold zone.   In the cold zone victims are further decontaminated (known as Specific Decontamination) and passed off to medical staff.  As many CBRNE events may also be a criminal or terrorist event in gross decontamination, all clothing is cut from the victim (for this training we use dummies), safely double bagged, tagged with a tracking number and transported with the victim as possible evidence.  This portion of the training requires all participants to rapidly apply skills learned and work in teams in a highly stressful environment.  

Following Northville, participants change out of the level B and into what some people affectionately call Marshmallow suits.  These are a charcoal lined chemical suits participant shall wear inside the toxic facility.  The instructors again warn participants that once inside the protective airlocks of the facility we will no longer be operating in a simulated environment.  We will be working with live nerve agents and using test equipment to identify the agents (GB and VX). Although medical counter measure agents are on hand, any leak in the suit or failure to follow instructions may result in lethal exposure.  Prior to entry into the inner core of the training facility each participant performs a series of exercises that simulate movements we might encounter while inside while exposed to Banana Oil Concentrate. If there were any leaks or failures in the suit or mask participants would know immediately.  After everyone passes this final test, participants pass through the final airlock door and into the core of the Live Agent Facility.  Here participants are separated into two man teams, secure test equipment and are led into smaller rooms which simulate a crime scene responders might experience during a CBW event. 

Upon entering the first room, participants notice what appear to be the remnants of a makeshift laboratory.  Participants line up around the room and the instructor signals to the operations command that you are ready for live agent.  Two individuals wearing PPE’s enter the room carrying a small box containing live agent.  Small amounts are placed on chilled plates.  Working in our teams, each participant employs the test equipment and the agent is identified as GB nerve agent (Sarin). With the limitations of movement and visibility caused by the chemical suits participants quickly learn that it’s not always an easy task to operate in this environment. Before leaving, the live agent is “Killed” by applying a bleach solution to the agent.  Each participant then washes off with the bleach solution and is checked for possible exposure (pin pointing of the eyes) before proceeding to the next room.

The next room is a simulated CBW crime scene.  Again, after lining up around the room, the two individuals enter, this time with VX Nerve Agent.  Participants then use various testing equipment and again experience how the equipment is used to verify the type of agent involved.  As was done in the first room, before leaving, the agent is “Killed” and all participants quickly decontaminate and are checked for exposure.  Participants are now ready for the final room, a simulation of a terrorist mass casualty event in a realistic urban landscape.

In all of the training participants so far, participants had not been exposed to an environment filled with flashing lights, sirens and other realistic distractions.  In this room they need to quickly assess the situation, report back to the incident commander and then when instructed, evacuate the room using appropriate triage.  The room is filled with pipe bombs, sirens, flashing lights and victims injuries ranging from severe lacerations to explosive amputation. Also included in this room are fatalities, some in responder uniforms. This room realistically simulates the stressful environment that responders may be asked to operate in.

The ritual and step by step process used to decontaminate and doff (take off) protective gear is just as critical as those to don (put on gear) and operate in contaminated environments.  Like everything else involved with this facility, there is a set ritual that must be followed to the letter.  Working in teams, participants help each other wash off any potential residue on their masks and gloves. They then pass through an airlock door into the doffing room.  Here they help their partner untie, unzip and prepare there suit for removal all while not potentially contaminating themselves or their partner.  Participants carefully remove the marshmallow coats and suits leaving mask and gloves in place.  Stepping into the next decon area they remove their gloves and socks and are separated (men in one room and women in the other) to doff their shorts; leaving participants wearing only a tee shirt and mask.  Using the tee shirt to prevent any contamination, participants then remove their shirt and mask in one motion and are directed to proceed to a two-step shower process. In the first shower, ice cold water is used to quickly close pores and rinse off any possible contamination. The second shower is warmer and participants finish their decontamination and get redressed in street clothes.

This Live Agent and other training is valuable for all responders including elected leaders.  It allows them to visualize what responders might face during a real event and see first-hand the limitations PPE’s create.  It allows participants to recognize the importance of ritual that is used throughout the entire CBW response. It provides a whole new perspective that policy leaders can then use at home when considering response needs and planning. But this is just a small example of training that is available to educate elected officials about the CBRNE threat.

Louisiana State University’s National Center for Biomedical Research and Training (NCBRT) ⁷ maintains both online and field delivered programs to State and Local jurisdictions for the education of both responders and elected officials.  Through a cooperative partnership with the DHS and the NDPC, these programs are free of charge to the local jurisdiction and are focused in areas ranging from Bio Terrorism events to contamination of food and agricultural assets. Like other training that is available, policy leaders can gain knowledge and insight into CBRNE events that allow them to speak more authoritively, recognize needs and threats as well as respond appropriately if and when an actual event occurs.

At the National Emergency Response and Rescue Training Center (NERRTC), Texas A&M’s Engineering Extension Service (TEEX) has developed and delivers training in all aspects of emergency response and includes CBRNE in some of its programs.  The Enhanced All Hazards Incident Management/Unified Command course, affectionately called by its participants as “ICS 300 on steroids” allows all participants to apply their knowledge and skills to large scale and expanding disaster simulations. In this program, participants rotate between the functional areas of Command, Operations, Finance / Admin, Planning and Logistics. As part of these exercises, local natural disasters are compounded by both accidental and purposeful chemical incidents.  An advantage of this training is that policy leaders gain the ability to participate in other functional areas and gain some perspective from other disciplines.  TEEX also maintains a large number of online and field delivered programs including the field delivered Crisis Leadership & Decision Making for Elected Officials ⁸.  This program is specifically designed for elected leaders to explore their own crisis leadership needs and examine the disaster response process from the leadership perspective.

The Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS) ⁹ located at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in Monterey California is a partnership between the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of the Navy. Since 2003, CHDS Mobile Education Teams (MET) have provided Executive Education Seminars to local government leaders on building capacity to prevent, deter and respond to domestic terrorist attacks.  These intensive ½ day seminars concentrate on the problems that Homeland Security poses for state and local level strategic planning, policy development, and organizational design. The target audience of these seminars is typically the Governor and their Senior Staff; however they are also available for Homeland Security leaders of major urban cities.

Responding to the need for Homeland Security leadership, CHDS has also developed the Master’s and Executive Leaders program. The Master’s Degree program is an intense 18 month program that includes six - two week in residence classes.  The Executive Leaders Program is a nine month program that includes four – one week in residence classes.  Both programs are open to elected and policy leaders and are fully funded by the Department of Homeland Security; however due to the high cost involved, class size is limited, are highly competitive and are difficult to gain acceptance into.

With the myriad of issues that elected and policy leaders face on an everyday basis it is easy to understand why emergency management / homeland security issues are put on a back burner.  Training in emergency management and homeland security requires the dedication of a vast amount of time and is often not possible for many elected officials.  However those leaders that do take that time are typically better prepared when a disaster strikes and are in a better position to provide the leadership needed in their communities.  As they also recognize the many complexities and challenges created by CBRNE events they are in a better position to appraise the capabilities of their communities and work to close the gaps discovered. By closing these gaps they are in fact helping improve the capacity to respond and recover and improving the overall preparedness of our nation.

 

NOTES;

1.      Department of Homeland Security. Information on Training Programs available
under NDPC. The National Domestic Preparedness Consortium.
http://www.ndpc.us/index.html.

 

2.      CDP - Public Affairs Department. "Toxic Agent Offers Real-World Response Skills
Training." The Center for Domestic Preparedness /COBRA training Facility.
http://cdp.dhs.gov/pdfs/news/features/COBRA.pdf.

 

3.      US Department of Labor. "General description and discussion of the levels of
protection and protective gear." Occupational Safety and Health Standards -
Hazardous Materials. http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.showdocument?ptable=STANDARDS&p_id=9767

 

4.      "Training by Program Letter." Center for Domestic
Preparedness. Accessed December 2, 2012. https://cdp.dhs.gov/schedules/
program_list.html.

 

5.      U.S. Department of Homeland Security - Center for Domestic Preparedness.
Incident Command: Capabilities Planning and Response Actions (WMD) and
All-Hazards. Student Manual - MGT-360 ic.11.07.00. Washington D.C: DHS,
2008.

 

 

6.      Arledge, Shannon. Mayor Richard Hildreth at CDP training. Photograph.
http://www.fema.gov/photolibrary/photo_details.do?id=46328.

 

7.      Louisiana State University. Homepage. The National Center for Biomedical
Research and Training. http://www.ncbrt.lsu.edu/.

 

8.      TEEX. "Course Description." MGT340 - Crisis Leadership & Decision Making for
Elected Officials. http://www.teex.org/ teex.cfm?pageid=training&area=teex&Division=USAR&Course=MGT340&templateid=14&navd iv=USAR.

 

9.      Center for Homeland Defense and Security. http://www.chds.us/.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

An Introduction and the purpose for this blog site.

I wish to thank you for taking the time to visit this blog site.  In a decade of serving the Citizens of Pacific Washington, I developed a unique combination of experience and education that provides me with the Knowledge, Skills and Abilities to excel in the Emergency Management / Homeland Security field.  I have a strong passion for this field and am excited at the opportunities that I know will be available.

I have established this blog site to provide you some insight into my qualifications, passions and writings.  Also included on this site are papers and other projects written for classes taken at American Military University.  I have included these papers to better demonstrate my passion and my ability to analyze issues.  As always, if you have any questions or comments, please contact me at Richhildreth@aol.com or by phone at 253-347-8514.

Respectfully,

Richard G Hildreth

7896 Sedgwick Road SE

Port Orchard, WA 98366

 

 

The following is a brief summary of my qualification for this position.

·         8 years leadership and management experience as Mayor of the City of Pacific, Washington.

o   Responsible for administration of all laws and functions of a municipal corporation as well as daily operations. 

o   Developed Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan and integrated plan with regional neighbors to ensure compatibility. 

o   Maintained regional approach working with Washington State, King and Pierce Counties, City of Auburn and Muckleshoot Tribal Nation as well as community organizations 

o   Appointed by Governor to the Washington State Emergency Management Council

 

·         2 years leadership experience as a Council Member of the City of Pacific Washington.

o   Responsible for creation, analysis and adoption of legislative motions, resolutions and ordinances.

·         6 years leadership as Governance Board member, Valley Regional Fire Authority: 

o   Founding member of VRFA Governance Board. 

o   Lobbied State Legislature to allow creation of first RFA in State of Washington. 

o   As part of an intergovernmental team, I helped establish initial governance structure, created administrative and command structure of department and assisted in development of strategic operations plan. 

 

·         I currently work as a volunteer for Kitsap County Department of Emergency Management assisting in public education, public outreach and CERT training.

 

·         I am a graduate of the Executive Leaders Program at the Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS.us) located at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey California.

 

·         I hold credentials from DHS/FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute (EMI) and /or Center for Domestic Preparedness (CDP) as a Master Exercise Practioner, ICS instructor, and Development and Delivery of Training Programs.

 

·         I currently hold a 3.89 GPA after 23 courses, hold a position on the Dean’s list and memberships in both the National Society of Collegiate Scholars and Golden Key.